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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~~~c.e.H
I~Y T. ITL. E l~S lTH. .AXCE
.\(,E:\( 1 1, now known as SECURITY
TITL~J OUARANTY CO.MPANY,
and ~ J~:t l. HI TY TITLE COMP.\XY. l"tah Corporations,
Plaintiffs-Rf's pond e nts,

)

1

Case No. 9925

-vs.~ECURITY
CO~IPAXY,

TITLE JXSl~RANCE
a California Corpora-

t i()II,

Defendant -Appclla nt.

Brief of Defendant-Appellant
DESIG-XATIOX OF PARTIES
For convenience the parties will be referred to in
brief a~ they were designated in the trial court. The
.Appellant, Security Title Insurance Company, will be
referred to either by name or as the Defendant, and the
Respondents will be referred to by name or as the Plaintiffs.
thi~

Page references to the transcript of the trial proreedings will be referred to as (T _______ ).
1
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STATEl\iENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiffs against
the Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, seeking to restrain the latter cmnpany frmn carrying on its
business as a title insurance company under its corporate name of "Security Title Insurance Company," or
any related or similar name employing the words "Security Title" and for damages suffered by reason of
alleged infringement of trade name and for damages suffered by reason of the Defendant having allegedly prevented the Plaintiff, Security Title Guaranty Company,
from qualifying as a title insurance company in the State
of Utah (T. 1-5, 46-48).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judgment was granted in favor of Plaintiffs restraining the Defendant " ... from doing business in the
State of Utah under the name, 'Security Title Insurance
Company' or under any name employing the words, 'Security Title' in any combination therein, or from using
said name or words in the solicitation, conduct or carrying on of the business of abstracting, land title examination, title insurance or any related activity." In addition the Defendant was ordered to forthwith remove or
cause to be removed from the window of the premises
of Stanley Title Company (Defendant's Utah agent) the
name "Security Title Insurance Company." The Plaintiffs' claims for monetary damages were dismissed (T.
61-62). From the portion of the judgment granting injunctive relief in favor of the Plaintiffs, the Defendant
appeals.

2
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HELIEF

~<HTGllT 0~

APPEAL

Dt>fendant seeks a reversal of that portion of the
judbl'lnent granting injunctive relief in favor of the
Plaintiff~. rrhe Defendant seeks to be allowed to continue
to do bu:-;ine~s in this state under its corporate name,
"SP('Ilrit~· Title Insurance Company," or at least in the
mune of "~ecurity Title Insurance Company of Los
AngeiP~, California."
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal brought by Defendant, Security
TitiP Insurance Company, from a judgment entered
again~t it in the Third District Court restraining the
C'ompany ·• ... from doing business in the State of Utah
undPr the name, 'Security Title Insurance Company,' or
undPt' any name e1nploying the words, 'Security Title'
in any combination therein, or from using said nan1e or
word~ in the solicitation, conduct or carrying on of the
bm-:inP~s of abstracting, land title exan1inations, title insuranee, or any related activity."
The question prlinarily involved is "·hether or not
the Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, should
1~~· rl'~trained from doing business in the State of Utah
under its corporate name after having qualified to do so
with the Insurance Commissioner of this state, and after
hwing done business in this state for nearly two years.
Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, is a
titlr insurance company and actually engaged in the
hnsinrss of insuring titles to land, having been organized

3
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in the State of California in 1920 (T. 315). Since that
time it has constantly grown in size until today it is one
of the large title insurance companies of the United
States (T. 315). During the last few years it has expanded its operation into several other states (T. 315),
and on December 6, 1960, it applied to the Utah State
Insurance Commissioner for a certificate of authority to
do business in the State of Utah as a foreign title insurer
under its corporate name (Exhibit No. 22)~
In the meantime, however, on December 1, 1944, the
Plaintiffs were organized and commenced doing business
in Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibits Nos. 9, 21). On De·cemher 1, 1944, the Plaintiff Security Title Company was
organized in this state and commenced doing business.
On August 23, 1957, it changed its name to "Security
Title Insurance Agency" (Exhibits Nos. 10, 21), and on
June 27, 1963, its name was again changed to "Security
Title Guaranty Company" (Exhibits Nos. 11, 21).
Neither of the Plaintiffs is a title insurance company, hut merely acts as an agent in acquiring business
for a title insurer.
Thus, by the time the Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, appJied to the Utah State Insurance
Commissioner for a certificate of authority to do business in this state as a foreign title insurer under its corporate name, the Plaintiff companies had been organized
in this state.
The filing of the application by the Defendant company for a certificate of authority was known to both of
4
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the Plaintiff companies, both of which companies vigorously oppost>d the granting of the certificate (T. 190).
As a matter of fact the Plaintiffs were represented by
counsel in their efforts to prevent the qualification of
the Defendant in the State of Utah (T. 190).
In the month of January, 1961, the Insurance Commissioner for the State of Utah approved the Defendant's
application for a certificate of authority (Exhibit No.
~~), and on March 25, 1961, in spite of the vigorous opposition of the Plaintiffs ( T. 190), the Secretary of State
of Utah issued its certificate, thus completing the Defendant'~ qualification as a title insurer in this state (T.
14, 35).
Thereupon, having failed in their efforts to prevent
the Defendant's qualification in the State of Utah, the
Plaintiff, Security Title Guaranty Company, resorted
to an outright subterfuge in attempting to "pirate" the
Defendant's own corporate name by registering the
same as its own trade name (Exhibit No. 3). In other
words, the Plaintiff, Security Title Guaranty Company,
then known as Security Title Insurance Agency, filed an
application with the Secretary of State for the registration of the Defendant's name, "Security Title Insurance
Company," as its own trade-mark or service-mark (Exhibit Xo. 3). ~I ark Eggertsen, who signed the application under oath as president of Security Title Insurance
Agency, declared in the application that the name "Security Title Insurance .Company" had first been used by
the Plaintiff as its trade name or trade-mark since December 1, 19-±-1 (Exhibit No. 3). At the trial of the case

5
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:Mark Egge-rtsen admitted on eross-examination that
Security Title Insurance Agency had, as a matter of fart,
never used the name "Security Title Insurance Company"
as a trade nan1e or trade-mark ( T. 192, 193). The information, therefore, contained in the Plaintiff's application was patently false (T. 192, 193).
Following its qualification in this state, the Defendant, subsequently, on April 4, 1961, entered into a contract
with Stanley Title Company whereby the latteT company undertook to act as agent in the State of Utah for
the Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company (T.
371).
Stanley Title Company had been organized by
George Stanley, one of the "oldtimers" in the abstracting and title insurance business (T. 363, 365).
On March 9, 1962, Stanley Title Company opened
an office at 60 East Fourth South Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah, which location had been recommended by
).1r. Rogers of Zion Savings Bank (T. 372). This was a
desirable location for Stanley Title Company to locate
inasmuch as it was near the City and County Building
and the Federal Building where records have to be constantly checked (T. 372). The Plaintiffs' offices are at
45 East Fourth South Street. On its front window in
large print, running across the center of the ·window,
Stanley Title Company had printed the words, "Stanley
Title Company." Immediately underneath the words
"Stanley Title Company" in large lettering are the words,
"Title Insurance . Abstracts . Escrows." In small letter6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing down in the lower right hand corner of the window
were printed the words, "State Agent for Security Title
ln~urance Company, Los Angeles, California." (Exhibit

,. o....•)'))
.,,
._> •

All of the business done by the Defendant, Security
Title Insurance Company, in the State of Utah since its
qualification has been handled through Stanley Title
Company (T. 322). The Defendant has not solicited any
busine~~. nor done any advertising. Stanley Title Company, the etah agent of the Defendant, has done business in its own name, that is, "Stanley Title Company,"
nwrely identifying its agency relationship with the Defendant on the front window of its business as noted on
Exhibit 3, and on its letterheads as shown on Exhibit
Xo. :23.

A point to be kept in n1ind and which we contend
Yital to the decision in this case is that the title insurance business is not a business dealing with the public
generally, but on the contrary is a specialized type of
business, generally handled by experts and professionally
qualified people who generally have occasion to deal with
mo~t of the local title co1npanies, know with whom they
are dealing, and are generally aware of the respective
connections with the various title insurance companies
who actually issue the title insurance policies (T. 205,
:20t), :20:2, 373, 37±, 37 6, 427' 436, ±39).
i~

On June 18, 1962, the Plaintiff, Security Title Insurance Agency, now known as Security Title Guaranty
Company, applied to the Commissioner of Insurance of

7
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the State of Utah, for a certificate of authority to do
business as a domestic title insurer in this state (Exhibit
No. 4). The D·efendant, of course, immediately filed an
objection with the office of the Insurance Commissioner
to the granting to Security Title Guaranty Company a
certificate authorizing the latter company to conduct
business as to title insurer·(Exhibit No.5).
On June 4, 1962, the Plaintiffs instituted suit against
the Defendant with the aforementioned results (T. 1, 61).
It is from this judgment that the Defendant appeals.
Since this is an equity case, the appeal may be on
questions of law and fact (Constitution of Utah, Article
8, Section 9). On review this Court, analogous to a trial
de novo on the record, should determine from a fair
preponderance or greater weight of the evidence whether
or not the findings of the trial court are supported thereby. Corey v. Roberts, 82 U. 445, 25 P.2d 940; Lawley v.
Hickenlooper, 61 U. 298, 212 P. 526; Budget System, Inc.
v. Budget Loam and Finance Plam, 12 Utah 2d 18, 361
P.2d 512.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS
OF F A·CT NOS. 12 and 14, IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW NOS. 2 AND 3, AND IN RESTRAINING THE DEFENDANT.

A. Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 14, Conclusions of
Law Nos. 2 and 3 and Decree.

8
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Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 14, Conclusions of Law
Nos. 2 and 3, and the Decree are so inter-related that
they are considered together under this Point of Argu-

ment.
Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 14 are as follows:
"12. The words or name 'Security Title' are
synonymous with the business of plaintiff corporations. The use by others than those associated
with plaintiff companies of words 'Security Title'
in the same general area of business activity, land
title examinations, abstracts and title insurance
or any part or function thereof is and will be confusing to those who have occasion to deal with
such companies.
"14. If pennitted to do so without restraint
by this Court, defendant corporation could under
the name 'Security Title Insurance Company' engage in direct competition with plaintiff corporations and the affiliates thereof in all parts of the
land title business to the irreparable injury of
plaintiffs."
Conelusions of LawN os. 2 and 3 are as follows:
"2. The defendant, its respective officers,
agents, servants and employees and all persons
whomsoever acting by or for the defendant should
be restrained from the use of the words or names
'Security Title' in any way within the State of
Utah, in connection with the business of land
titles, abstracts or title insurance, and defendant
should be permanently enjoined from doing business as a title insurer in the State of Utah under
the name Security Title Insurance Company or
lmder any name in which the words 'Security
Title' appear in any combination whatever.
9
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"3. Defendant should be ordered to remove
forthwith the name 'Security Title Insurance
Company' from the office window at 60 East 4th
South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah and should be
allowed a period of 90 days in which to either
qualify under another name as a title insurer in
the State of Utah or to withdraw therefrom. During such period defendant or its agent, Stanley
Title, should be permitted to use the preliminary
report forms such as exhibit 35, and the letterheads which bear the name Security Title Insurance Company in small letters, but during such
90 day period no enlargement of use of said
names should be permitted and thereafter defendant should be permanently restrained from use
of such name or any name embodying the words
'Security Title' in doing business in the State of
Utah."
The Decree entered by the trial court provided in
part as follows :
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DE'CREED that the defendant, Security
Title Insurance Company, its respective officers,
agents, servants and employees and any person
or corporation acting by or for defendant in any
cap:acity be, and each of them is hereby prohibited,
restrained and enjoined from doing business in
the State of Utah under the name, 'Se-curity Title
Insurance Company,' or under any name employing the words, 'Security Title' in any combination
therein, or from using said name or words in the
solicitation, conduct or carrying on of the business of abstracting, land title examination, title
insurance or any related activity.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant forthwith

10
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remove or cause to be removed from the window
of the premises occupied by said Stanley Title
Company, agent of defendant, at 60 East -!th
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, the name 'Security
Title Insurance Company.' "

B. Contention of Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company.

rrhe Defendant contends that having qualified as a
foreign insurer in this state with the Insurance ConunissionPr it thereupon was and is free to use its corporate
name in the pursuit of its business as long as it does
not do so in such a \vay as to cause or probably cause
confusion. The evidence, as will be pointed out hereafter, does not support Findings Nos. 12 and 1-1, Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 or 3, nor upon the Decree as entered.
On the contrary the record shows that both Plaintiffs
and Defendant deal generally with a professional, infonned clientele; that the Plaintiffs and Defendant are
not competitors inasmuch as the Defendant is a title
insurance company, while the Plaintiffs are merely title
insurance agencies; that the words "security" and "title"
are in common use and generic in character; that the
Defendant has, since its operation, taken considerable
care to properly identify itself so that in nearly two
years of operation there has been no confusion, nor is
there any reasonable probability of confusion in the
future.

C. Review of Law Controlling the Case.
The Court's attention is first invited to the legal principles controlling the case. The essential inquiry is
11
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whether or not there is confusion or a probability of confusion. In considering this question, the Court should
examine, among other things, the nature of the business
and the class of persons patronizing the same, how the
names are actually being used, the nature of the words
involved in the names, and the competition or lack thereof between the parties.
(1) The Essential Question.

The essential question is always whether or not there
is confusion or a probability of confusion.
Said the court in Federal Securities Co. v. Federal
Securities Corp., 276 P. 1100 (Ore., 1929), 66 A.L.R. 934,
946:

"The ultimate question is always whether
trade is being unfairly diverted, and whether the
public is being eheated into the purchase of something which it is not in fact getting; the c'Ourts
interfere solely to prevent deception.

* * *
"When it has been found that there is a similarity of names, a court does not cease its inquiries and at once grant relief, but proceeds to
ascertain whether the other facts are such that
deception and injury are l~kely."
(2) The Importance of the Nature of the Bus.iness.

The nature of the business involved and the class of
persons patronizing the same are particularly important.
"The class of persons who patronize the particular business or who buy the particular kind

12
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of article manufactured, such as servants or children, on the one hand, or persons skilled in the
particular trade on the other, must be considered
in determining the question of probable deception;
in every case the court should determine the question by placing itself in the position of the average person to whom the appeal for patronage is
directed. Furthermore, the apprehension of confusion because of similarity of names is less in
noncompetitive than in competitive businesses."
87 C.J.S., Trade-Marks, Etc., Sec. 92, page 332.
Authorities on this point have been collected by the
annotator in 115 A.L.R. 1.241, 1245:
··As was pointed out in the original annotation, the status of the corporations in the commercial field-e.g., the character of the business
and of the products, and the placE' where the business is carried on-often has an important bearing on the right of a corporation to protection
against the use of its name by another corporation.
"This principle has been applied in two recent c>ases in connection with the differences
between the business of insurance corporations
and the business of ordinary trading or commercial corporations.
"Thus, in Standard Acci. Ins. Co. v. Standard
Surety & C. Co. (1931; D.C.) 53 F. (2d) 119, it
was held that since the business of casualty insurance and surety companies is conducted
through insurance agents or brokers or with the
insurance experts of large concerns rather than
with the general public, a greater degree of similarity is permitted in respect of the corporate
names of such companies.
13
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"And in Central Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. (1936) 275 Mich. 554, 267 N.\V.
733, it was said: 'There is probably greater latitude allowed to banks and insurance companies
in the similarity of corporate names than in the
case of ordinary mercantile corporations.'"
See also Federral Securities Co. v. Federal Securities
Corp., 276 P. 1100 (Ore., 1929), 66 A.L.R. 934; 66 A.L.R.
948, 962.
(3)

The Significance of the Nature of the Name.

The nature of the names themselves must also be
considered. In Truck Ins. Exchange v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 1940, 165 Or. 332, 107 P.2d 511, 523, both the
plaintiff and the defendant used the term "Truck Insurance Exchange'' in their respective business names. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of the term by defendants as
a part of its business name. In denying relief the court
said:
"No one can dip into the common vocabulary
and, selecting some generic or descriptive words
which commonly designate the business activities
in which people engage, as, for instance, grocery
store, appropriate the words to himself and thereby forbid their use by others who desire to launch
similar enterprises. The words 'Truck Insurance
Exchange,' which both the plaintiff and one of the
defendants employ as their names, is a term of
that kind and, therefore, incapable of exclusive
appropriation.

* • *
"It is always the business., and not the name,
which is protected in suits of this character."
14
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A greater degree of sin1ilarity will be allowed where
the nrunes an· geographical or descriptive. Said the court
in FcdcralS('curitics Co. v. Federal Securities Corp., 276
P. 1100 (Ore., 1929) :
"A great degree of similarity in names will
be tolerated where they are geographical or descriptive than where the first corporation's name
is fanciful and arbitrary."

It is also important to note that meTe similarity is
not sufficient to warrant an injunction. There must be
a use of the similar name which causes mistake as to
identity before a court of equity will permit an injunction to issue, and then the injunction will issue only
as to the particular use and not as to the similarity.

In Em,ployers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Employers'
Liability Ins. Co., 10 N.Y Supp. 845, 847, the court said:

"The rule as to the use of names where both
parties are entitled to the same name, and in
cases where no fraud or deceit is charged or
proven, (as in this case) has been stated in Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N.Y. 427, and it is there held
that such confusion as results merely from similarity will not be a ground for injunction, but
where, even innocently, a defendant so uses his
name .as to cause mistake as to identity, and to
induce the public to believe that he is the plaintiff,
the general use of the name will not be enjoined,
but the particular manner of the use which causes
the mistake, confusion, and consequent injury will
be."
The Supreme Court of California has similarly held
in the case of American Automobile Ass'n. v. American
A11fomobile 0. Ass'n., 13 P.2d 707, 712:

15
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"Since plaintiff had no exclusive property
right by way of trade-mark in the use of the name,
it follows that the mere similarity of names does
not establish the fraud. It must be such a misuse of the name by advertising and soliciting as
amounts to fraud, and without this proof no relief may be granted, .... "
With regard to similarity of names the Court should
take cognizance of the words in the name that are descriptive and if it is the descriptive words that cause the confusion, there are no grounds for an injunction.
In Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Employers'
Liability Ins. Co., 10 N.Y. Supp. 845, 846, the court said:
"The words (Employers Liability) have become descriptive of one kind of insurance business, just as the words 'fire,' 'marine,' 'accident,'
'life,' indicate other kinds of insurance. ' ... those
words, therefore', have become the general designation of a certain kind or department of the
insurance business, and do not express proprietorship or origin, and, while the plaintiff was the
pioneer in this particular branch of underwriting,
and the first to use the words referred to, it has
not shown such a present exclusive right as would
justify the injunction on that ground.'"
As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Del. & H. Camal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 20 L. Ed.

581:
"True, it may be that the use by a second producer, in describing truthfully his product, of a
name or a combination of words already in use
by another, may have the effect of causing the
public to mistake as to the origin or ownership of
the product; but if it is just as true in its applica-
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tion to his goods as it is to those of another who
first applied it and who, therefore, claims an exclusive right to use it, there is no legal or moral
wrong done. Purchasers may be mistaken, but
thray are not deceived by false representations, and
equity will not enjoin against telling the truth."
(-l) Hmr the Names Are Acht.ally Being Used.

rl'he Court's attention is invited to such cases as
Saunders v. Sun L. Assur. Co. (1894) 1 Ch. (Eng.) 537.
noted in 66 A.L.R. 948, 983, where the defendant company
was ordered to print the words "of Oanada" in as prominent lettering as the preceding words; Farmers Loan
&T. Co. v. Farmers Loan & T. Co. (1888) 21 Abb. N.C.104,
1 N.Y. Supp. +±,noted in 66 A.L.R. 948, 982, where the
court pennitted the use of the words, "Fanners Loan &
Trust Co.," providing the words "of Kansas" were added;
International Trust Co. v. Internat.ional Loan & T. Co.
( ts91) 153 :Mass. 271, 10 L.R.A. 758, 26 N.E. 693, and
noted in 66 A.L.R. 948, 982, where the requirement was
8imply made that there be adequate identification; and
the case of Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securities
Corp., 276 P. 1100 (Ore., 1929), 66 A.L.R. 934, where the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from the use
of its corporate name, the decree of the Circuit Court
was upheld, dismissing the complaint and allowing the
defendant to continue to do business in the State of Oregon. but ordered the defendant to continue the practice
of using the phrase "of Illinois" in connection with its
name, and directed that it should be in type, as large,
at least, as the defendant's name, and in an equally
conspicuous place.
17
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( 5) Competition or Lack Thereof.
The Court's attention is invited to Truck Insurance
Exchange v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 107 P.2d 511,
165 Or. 332 (1940), where the plaintiff was authorized
" ... to maintain an agency for the issuing, writing and
selling policies of insurance issued by the regularly incorporated insurance companies. . .", and the defendant solicited insurance business in a different way as an
insurance exchange. The court held at page 524:
"Even if we assume that the plaintiff conducted an insurance agency, that type of business
and the one in which the defendants are engaged
are so different that, unless the defendants change
their business or their methods, the possibility of
the public being misled is too remote to entitle
the plaintiff to an injunction; .at least the record
fails to indicate that any member of the public
has been misled."
(6) Analysis of Leading Cases.

Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co. of New York, 53 F. 2d 119 (District Court, S.D.
New York, 1931), is a leading case in this area of the
law. Involved was a suit to restrain the defendant from
using its corporate name, "Standard Surety & Casualty
Co. of New York," or any other name containing the word
"Standard," on the ground that such use would constitute unfair competition with the plaintiff, which had the
name "Standard Accident Insurance Company." Both
companies were insurance companies engaged only in
the casualty and surety fields throughout the United
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StatPs and were in din·et cmnpetition with each other.
'Phe plaintiff was incorporated in 1884 in :Michigan and
had heen li<'Pnsed to do business in every state for many
yt>ars and in ~ ew York since 1888. The defendant was
ineorporated in 1928 in New York, and its business had
bt1t•n gradually increasing. The question presented was
whether the defendant by the mere use of its own corporate na1ne in the casualty insurance and surety fields
infringed any rights of the plaintiff. The court toO'k cognizan<'e of the exceedingly valuable good will of the plaintiff, but also noted that the defendant's name was chosen
in good faith and without any desire to have it confused
with the plaintiff's. The court also noted the strong
8imilarity between the names and the use by each company of the word "Standard":
"There is, of course, a strong similarity between the two names. While they have only one
word in common, 'Standard,' that is the dominant
element in each and, though not highly distinctive,
is sufficient to cause some confusion in the minds
of the general public. It is a common descriptive
word connoting stability, general recognition, and
conformity to established practice; and it to some
extent suggests that the company issues the statutory standard form of policies."
The court then considered the nature of the busim•ssPs involved and the type of people with whom each
dealt:
''In determining the effect of this similarity,
due weight should be given to the system employed by casualty and surety companies in getting business. Unlike the life insurance companws, they make no direct appeal to the general
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public. The applications are brought to them by
brokers or agents who have generally secured
the business without regard to the company in
which it is to be placed. At least 95 per cent of
all the persons who apply to the agents and
brokers are not at all concerned about what company is to issue the policy; faith in the broker
or agent and in the state insurance department
is substituted for reliance upon the reputation
of the individual company. As to them, the name
of the company is not considered and its possible
confusion with another is immaterial. The remaining 5 per cent of the applicants (whose business, however, is 15 to 20 per cent of the total)
are practically all insurance experts, such as insurance m~nagers of large industrial corporations, and they choose the company after an investigation of its record and resources. With
them a mere similarity in names would generally he insufficient to cause confusion.
"The good will of casualty and surety companies is, therefore, not so closely tied up to their
names as is that of commercial companies or even
life insurance corporations, and a similarity is not
so important to them. The' brokers, agents, and
insurance managers who actually decide in what
company to place the business are sufficiently
familiar with the personnel, location, etc., of the
various companies that they could not be misled
by mere similarity ·of names as the general public
would be. This is shown by the large number of
insurance companies with very similar names."
The court then made the following conclusion:
"The conclusion that must he drawn, therefore, is that the possibility of confusing the general public is by no means the test to be applied,
and that the professional insurance men and ex20
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perts who are in a sense the plaintiff's public,
are not likely to be misled merely by the degree
of similarity in this case."
The <'Ourt thereupon held that the plaintiff was not
Pntitled to appropriate to its exclusive use so common
and <lPsirahle a word as "Standard."

Central Milt. Auto Ins. Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co.,
~ti7 N. \Y. 733 (.Mich. 1936) is a more recent and most
significant decision. In this case the plaintiff, a domestic
insurance company with its principal place of business in
Detroit, Michigan, sought to restrain the defendant, a foreign insurance company admitted to do business in
the State of l\1ichigan, from using the name "Central
:\[ utu.al Insurance Company" in the State of 1\:Iichigan.
The question in the case was whether the name of
the defendant so closely resembled the name of the plaintiff that its use should be enjoined. The case has a striking- similarity to the instant case inasmuch as the defendant company had been admitted to do business in the
State of ni ichigan by the Commissioner of Insurance. On
this point the court stated:
"The action of the commissioner of insurance
indicates he was not impressed that confusion
would arise from defendant's admission to do
business in the state. Young & Chaffee Furniture
Co. v. Chaffee Bros. Furniture Co., 204 :\Iich. 293,
170 X.W. -!S. The action of the commissioner of
insurance in authorizing defendant to do business
in this state is the action of a public official to
whom has been delegated the power of preventing

21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

any wrong to plaintiff by reas·on of the similarity
of the name of defendant with that of plaintiff,
and his action is entitled to respect. His determination, while not final and conclusive, is entitled
to great weight and is not to be set aside or overthrown without positive proof of substantial injury or probable injury to plaintiff. Mere fear
or possibility of injury is not sufficient. Young &
Chaffee Furniture Co. v. Chaffee Bros. Furniture
Co., supra."
The court then turned to the vital question of confusiOn:
"There may be some confusion resulting from
the similarity of the names of plaintiff and defendant, but the confusion of which the court
takes cognizance must be something more than
that resulting from carelessness or ignorance on
the part of the uninformed. The strong arm of a
court may not, in equity and good conscience, be
invoked on account of anything over which defendant has no control. Defendant is not an insurer against the ignorance or carelessness of
particular individuals and may be enjoined from
the use of its corporate name after admission to
do business in the state by the commissioner of
insurance by that name, only upon a showing the
similarity of its name to that of plaintiff will mislead, or probably mislead, the public to the detriment or injury of plaintiff. Federal Securities Co.
v. Federal Securities Corporation, 129 Or. 375,
276 P. 1100, 66 A.L.R. 934; 6 Fletcher on Corporations ( 1931 Ed.) p. 55.
"There is probably greater latitude allowed
to banks and insurance companies in the similarity of corporate names than in the case of
ordinary mercantile corporations. New York Trust
Co. v. New York County Trust Co., 125 Misc. 735,
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~ll

N. Y.S. 785; Standard Accident In~. Co. v.
Standard Surety & Casualty Co. (D.C.) 53 F. (~d)
11~)."

The court then pointed out that it could only con~ider the eorporate names as such and not popular abbreviations of the same:
"Plaintiff claims that notwithstanding its
corporate name it has become known by the name
'Central Mutual Insurance Company' and as 'Central .Mutual,' and its insurance policies as 'Central' policies. This is immaterial. The plaintiff
must stand or fall on its corporate name. The
statutes above quoted recognize the corporate
name only. Detroit Savings Bank v. Highland
Park State Bank of Detroit, 201 :Mich. 601, 167
N.W. 895."
Then the court said :
"The cases of confusion in business between
the two insurance companies here involved are,
under the prO'of, trivial in character, and within
the rule of Saunders v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (1894), 1 Ch. 537; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co ..
supra; New York Trust Co. v. New York County
Trust Co., supra."
The court concluded by holding in favor of the defendant and reversing the trial court which had restrained the defendant.
Another leading case is Lawyers T.itle Ins. Co. v.
Lall'yers Title Ins. Corporation, 109 F.2d 35, cert den 309
r .S. 68-!, 60 S. Ct. 806, S-! L. Ed. 1028. This case involved
a suit by Lawyers Title Ins. Co. against Lawyers Title

23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Ins. Corporation for an injunction restraining the defendant corporation from using its corporate name in
engaging in the business of insuring real estate titles
in the District of Columbia. The corporate names of
the plaintiff and defendant were identical except in the
difference in the words "Company" and "Corporation."
On appeal the judgment dismissing the action in
favor of the defendant was affirmed. The defendant attempted to induce the plaintiff to become its agent in
the District of Columbia, hut the plaintiff declined. Failing to find another satisfactory agent, defendant qualified in the District of Columbia in 1935 and in 1938 opened its own office less than a block distant from the plaintiff's. The following excerpt from the opinion sets forth
the pertinent findings of the trial court:
"The trial court found that defendant's entrance into the District was 'in the process of the
natural and logical development of its business,'
not only for expansion but to give more efficient
service to existing customers ; that the location
of its office was selected, not to divert business
~tnfairly from plaintiff, but because of its nearness to offices of real estate brokers and others
having title business; that defendant did not
choose its name originally in order to lure business from plaintiff (in fact at that time it had no
intention of competing with plaintiff) ; and that
defendant has done all that reasonably could be
required of it to prevent confusion of identity
with plaintiff.
"Evidence sustaining the latter finding shows
that on defendant's office door, letterheads, forms,
signs, advertising and telephone listings, it h~s
added to the statement of its corporate name d1s24
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tinguishing matter, such as 'Home Office-Richmond, Yirginia Washington Branch.' Similary distinguishing identification is made orally in answering telephone calls. Distinctive type, color
and arrangement, not similar to those used by
plaintiff, are employed in signs, letterheads,
fonns, etc.
"The court found further that title certificates and policies are obtained in Washington
principally by real estate brokers and lawyers for
their clients, and by banks, insurance companies,
}oan and trust companies and building associations, all of whom are experienced in title matters.
will not be misled by the similarity of names, and
constitute a discriminating clientele; that there is
no evidence disclosing any injury to plaintiff by
defendant's conduct; and that there is no reasonable probability that plaintiff will suffer injury·
on account of confusion of identity with defendant, in view of the dissimilarity in publicity created by defendant."
Pursuant to these findings the court denied relief
to the plaintiff and dismissed the bill on three grounds:
(1) that plaintiff has not shown such similarity of names
by which it and defendant are known publicly as to deceive plaintiff's customers and divert their business to
defendant; ( 2) that defendant has done all that reasonably could be required to prevent confusion of identities;
and (3) that the services in question are rendered to a
discriminating clientele, who will not be misled by "any
fortuitous similarity" of the corporate names.
The Court of Appeals held that the findings of fact
were sustained bY the evidence and that the judgment
of the trial court was right. The court noted that the
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names were practically identical and that there was no
deliberate attempt by one competitor to simulate another
or e·mploy a crafty scheme for luring a-way business by
deception. Said the court :
"Their subjective attitudes, if material, are
not fraudulent or dishonest."
The court noted the essential question in this case
in the following language:
"The naked question is whether plaintiff has
an exclusive right, by virtue of prior appropriation in this jurisdiction, to use the name which
each has acquired lawfully and with honest purpose."
The court observed the plaintiff's contention, which
Is essentially the contention of the plaintiff in the instant case:
"Plaintiff contends, however, that it has acquired in its name a more absolute right, unqualified by necessity for showing such injury
or danger of public confusion. Defendant's right
to do business in the District is not, and could
not well be, disputed. But if defendant does so,
plaintiff asserts, in effect, that it must use a new
name, different from that in which it has been
incorporated and with which it has built good will
in many places. It is the name, therefore, and not
merely the business which is done in it, to which
plaintiff claims exclusive title and use. Prior in
tempore prior ( et solus) in jure est summarizes
plaintiff's view."
S.aid the court: "We find no authority to sustain
a right so absolute." 'The court refused to recognize an
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ah:-;olutP right to the name created merely by in('orpora-

tion eft't-etive to exclude others regardless of time and
1·i rcumstance. The court viewed the decision as one to be
base on prin('iples of unfair trade. The court did note a
lack on the part of the plaintiff in building and maintaining good will exclusively and distinctively about its
present corporate name. The court further noted that
thP probability of confusion was "reduced further by
the experienced and discriminating character of the clientele to which defendant and the plaintiff's combination
appeal, and the care defendant has taken to add distinguishing matter to its name in publicity and solicitation."
The court noted that occasional misunderstanding might
()('('llr despitL• these precautions, but said: " ... there is
nothing to show probability of more than that, and in
it~Plf that does not justify the drastic relief here sought."

The court's observations on the generic character
of the words and the status of the corporation, are likewi~e apparent:
"'Ve have made no point of the fact that
plaintiff's name appears to be composed of generic words, W'hich could not be registered as a
trademark and which considerable authority indicates cannot be appropriated exclusively by incorporation. Nor do we think it material that defendant is a foreign corporation competing with
domestic ones, since the District of Columbia has
no statute placing the former on a peculiar basis
and we deem the case to be governed by conceptions of tmfair trade, which make no distinction
in tlris respect between domestic and foreign companies."
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The annotator in 66 A.L.R. 9-!8 at page 983 has cited
other cases involving insurance companies. In each instance noted, the defendant companies were' permitted
to continue to operate :
"-'Commercial Union Assurance Co., Limited,' and 'Commercial Union Life Insurance Co. of
New York' (the first company was authorized
to carry on only a fire and marine insurance business, while the second company was purely a life
insurance company; but the court said that, independently of this difference, the names were not
so similar as to mislead), Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Smith (1888) 2 N.Y. Supp. 296;
" - 'Continental Insurance Company of the
City of New York' and 'Continental Fire Association of Ft. Worth, Texas' (reliance was placed
upon the different plans under which the two companies did business, the former issuing policies
for fixed premiums only, and the latter doing
business on the mutual plan ; and upon the fact
that the business was all done through .agents,
who were well aware of the difference in names),
Continental Ins. Co. v. Continental Fire Asso.
(1900) 41 C. C. A. 326, 101 Fed. 255;
"-'Guardian Fire & Life Assurance Co.' and
'Guardian Horse, Vehicle, & Gene~r.al Insurance
Co.' (upon an offer by defendants to assume the
latter name instead of 'Guardian & General Insurance Co. (Limited),' which was held to constitute an infringement, the court said that this
would be satisfactory), Guardian F. & L. Assur.
Oo. v. Guardian & G. Ins. Co. (1880) 50 L. J. Ch.
N.S. (Eng.) 253;
"-'London & Provincial Law Assurance Society' and 'London & Provincial Joint-Stock Life
Insurance Co.' (where the first company w.as a
28
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society of la,vyers, and the second company was
composed of Inercan tile n1en; and where length
of usage of the nrune by the first company was not
shown), London & P. Law Assur. Soc. v. London
& P. Joint-Stock L. Im.;. Co. (lH-!7) 11 Jur. (Eng.)
938:
''-'London Assurance' and 'London & \r e:->tminster Assurance Corporation (Limited),' London Assurance v. London & W. Assur. Corp.
(1863) 3~ L.J. Ch. N.S. (Eng.) 664;
" -'Society of l\lotor :Manufacturers & Traders, Ld.,' and 'Motor Manufacturers' & Traders'
:\lutual Insurance Co., Ld.' (the facts that the
c01npanies were not engaged in the same line of
business, and that the words used were generi<',
however, were the principal ground for the decision), Society of :Motor l\Ifrs. & Traders v.
:Motor Mfrs' & T. Mut. Ins. Co. (1925) 1 Ch.
(Eng.) 675;
" - 'Sun Life Assurance Society' and 'Sun
Life Assurance Co. of Canada' (the defendant
company· was ordered, however, to print the words
'of Canada' in as prominent lettering as the preceding words; the defendant company had been in
existence for several years in Canada, although it
had not done any business in England; and the
court expressly noted that it was not a case of a
newly organized company seeking to benefit by
the name of an older company), Saunders v. Sun
L. Assur. Co. (189-±), 1 Ch. (Eng.) 537;
" - 'Travelers Insurance Co.' and 'Travelers
Insurance Machine Co.' (the character of the
words as generic terms, and the fact that the corporations were not in the same line of business,
were the principal grounds for the decision, however), Travelers Ins. Mach. Co. v. Travelers Ins.
Co. (1911) 142 I{y. 523, 13± S.W. 877 (rehearing
in (1911) 1±3 I{y. 216, 136 S.\V. 15-t) ;"
29
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Ban:ks and trust con1panies, like insurance companies, have been permitted to have a greater degree of
similarity in their names, and the annotator in 66 A.L.R.
948 at page 982 notes three such decisions:
" - 'Farmers Loan & Trust Co.' and 'Fanners Loan & Trust Co. of Kansas' (temporary
injunction issued, forbidding the use, of the words
'Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,' but permitting such
use if the words 'of Kansas' were added), Farmers Loan & T. Co. v. Farmers Loan & T. Co.
(1888) 21 Abb. N.C. 104,1 N.Y. Supp. 44;
"-'Fidelity Bond & Mortgage Co.' and 'Fidelity Bond & l\fortgage Co. of Texas' (in this
case, however, the evidence showed that the former company did very little business in Texas,
and had not exclusively appropriated the field,
and this seemed to be more the controlling factor
than the dissimilarity in names), Fidelity Bond &
Mortg. Co. v. Fidelity Bond & Mortg. Co. (1929;
D.C.) 33 F. (2d) 580;

* * *
'' - 'International Trust Co.' and 'International Loan & Trust Co. of Kanasas City,' or 'International Loan & Trust Co. of Kansas City,
Mo.' (words 'of Kansas City' or 'of Kansas City,
Mo.,' being made equally conspicuous with preceding words), International Trust Co. v. International Loan & T. Co. (1891) 153 Mass. 271, 10
L.R.A. 758, 26 N.E. 693 ;"
The case of International Trust Co. v. International
Loan & Trust Co., 26 N.E. 693 (Mass., 1891) is particularly in point. The plaintiff was a Massachusetts corporation organized and doing business in that state. The
defendant was a Missouri corporation, orginally char30
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tPrPd nndPr the name of "Xational Loan & Trust Compuny," wlti('h ruune was later changed by vote of the
:-;t()(·kholders to ''International Loan & Trust Company."

'l 1he plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from carrying on its businPss in nlassachusetts under its corporate
nmne, contending that the name of the defendant was so
nearly identieal with the naine of plaintiff that it was
liabiP to mislead, and had in fact misled, the public,
p:-;pPeially persons having occasion to deal with plaintiff.
At the hearing the plaintiff introduced testimony
tPnding to show that defendant's corporate naine would
mislead, and in fact had misled, the public, but the pre~iding justice ruled, apart from that evidence, that the
defendant's corporate name was so nearly identical with
the plaintiff's as to mislead. The defendant contended
that the name under which it had in fact done business in
tlw state of :Massachusetts was not "International Loan
& Trust Company" but "International Loan & Trust
Company of l{ansas City," or "International Loan &
Tnt~t Cmnpany of Kansas City, ~iissouri," and that this
name was not so nearly identical with plaintiff's as to
mislead.
The evidence showed that with a few minor exceptions in all its circulars and advertisements the words
"Kansas City" were printed in conspicuous type and in
connection with the nan1e. The court was of the opinion
that defendant's corporate name was so nearly identical
with plaintiff's that it would mislead, but took cognizance
of the fact that even if there were a similarity of corpo-
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rate names, the defendant in carrying on its business
had always appended further identifying words. The
following language of the court is most significant:
"On the other hand, even if the corporate
name of a foreign corporation was the same, or
nearly identical with that of a domestic corporation, but it did not carry on its business under
such name, but under a different and dissimilar
one, there would seen1 to be no reason why it
should be enjoined. No harm would be done, and
nobody would suffer. We think, also, the question
whether the names are so nearly identical as to
mislead must be settled by the application of the
principles which apply to analogous cases respecting trade-marks. As already noted, the presiding
justice found that the words 'of Kansas City'
had been printed, with a few minor exceptions,
in all its circulars and advertisements, in conspicuous type, and in connection with the name.
It also appears from the reported evidence that
the sign upon the windows of the office in Boston
was 'International Loan & Trust Company of
Kansas City, Missouri,' in letters, as we infer,
all of large size ; that on the letter and note and
account heads used by it were printed in large
letters of equal size the words, 'International
Loan & Trust Co., of Kansas City, Mo.'; that the
imprint on envelopes mailed by it to parties was
'International Loan & Trust Co., of Kansas City,
Mo.," all in letters of the same and of a fair size;
that upon the envelopes furnished to return to it
the same title was printed, the words 'of Kansas
City, Mo.,' being composed of letters somewhat
sm'aller than those used in the rest of the descrip-tion, but of blacker and more solid appearance, so
that its correspondents could not fail to have their
attention called to it; and that upon the state-
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nwnts of its eondition it was dPserilwd as t:a•
'lntPrnational Loan & Trust Co., of I~ansas City,
~lo.' \Yith the exception of somP certificates of
dqmsit, which we asstune were used in its corporate name, although there is no evidence to that
pfft-('t, and the use of the words 'International
Loan & Trust Co.,' as part of their connection
with tlw sibrnature to its correspondence, there is
nothing that shows that either the words 'of
Kansas City' or 'of K_ansas City, nlo.' have not
been invariably used in connection with the corporate name. We think the fair result of this evidence is that the words 'of Kansas City' or 'of
Kansas City, Mo.' have formed almost as component a part of the name actually used by the
defendant in carrying on its businPss in this state
as the words 'International' or 'Loan' or 'Trust.'
And "·e do not see how a na1ne or title or description consisting of the words 'International Loan
& Trust Company, of Kansas Cit~·,' or the same
words 'vith the contraction 'Mo.' added, can be
said to be the same as, ·or so nearly identical with
'International Loan & Trust Company,' as to
mislead. Two out of the four witnesses called by
the plaintiff (being the only ones whose attention
was directed to the matter) admitted that the addition of the words 'of Kansas Ciy' would remove
any mnbiguity or trouble. It is not sufficient that
some person might possibly be misled, but the
similarity must be such that 'any person with such
reasonable care and caution as the public generally are capable of using and may be expected to
exercise would mistake the one for the other.'
Gilman v. Hunnewell, 122 :Jfass. 139, 1-tS; Partridge Y. :Jfenck, 2 Sandf. Ch. 625; Snowden v.
Xoah Hopk. Ch. 3-!7; l\IcLean v. Fleming, 96 r.S.
2-!-3, :231; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Farmers' L. &
T. Co. of l{ansas, 1 X.Y. Supp. -!-!;Gail v. \Vackerbarth, 2S Fed. Rep. 286."
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The court then made the following disposition of the
case:
"The result upon the whole case, then is that
the injunction is to be modified so as to restrain
the defendant from doing under its corporate
name any business in this state the same as or
similar to that which the plaintiff is authorized
to carry on, leaving the defendant free to engage
in any business which its charter adn1its under
the name of 'International Loan & Trust Company, of Kansas City,' or 'International L·oan &
Trust Company, of Kansas City, Mo.,' and, as thus
modified, the injunction is to issue."
In the case of Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securities Corp., Supra, where the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant in the use of its corporate name,
the Supreme Court of Oregon upheld the decree of the
trial court which permitted the defendant to continue
to do business in the State of Oregon but ordered the
defendant to continue the practice of using the phrase
"of Illinois" in connection with its name and directed
that it should he printed in type, as large, at least, as
the defendant's name and in an equally conspicuous place.

D. Review of Evidence.
(1) Nature of Businesses Involved.

A review of the evidence demonstrates that the case
should be governed hy the legal principles discussed.
It is first noted that the parties are not common ordinary businesses dealing with the general uninformed
34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

public. rrlw DPft-ndant is a title insurance cmnpany. The
Plaintiffs are tit IP insurance ageneit-s. Insofar as title
in~urance eompanit-s and title insurance agencie~ an·
('oncerned, tht- eustomer clientele is largely 1nade up
of Pxperts and professional personnel such as ban:ks,
~avings and loan cmnpanies, insurance companies, other
lending institutions, persons engaged in the real estate
business, and lawyers, etc. (T. 374) .
•JP~se Ellertson, the president of Title Insurance
.\gPney of t:tah, Inc., one of the prominent title insurance agencies of this state, testified that 95% of his
bu~int>ss comes from such professional sources (T. ±37).
Ut>orge Stanley of the Stanley Title Company, Defendant's agent, testified that only 12 out of the last 1140
jobs done came frmn non-professional sources (T. 376);
and :J[ark Eggertsen, president of Plaintiff companies
l'Yen conceded that about 75 to 80% of his business like'vise eame from that source ( T. 212).
(~)

Parties Are Not in Competition.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Defendant is
a title insurance emnpany engaged in the business of actually issuing title insurance policies ( T. 313). X either
of the Plaintiffs are title insurance companies, but are
mere title insurance agencies engaged in the business
of dealing in land titles, abstracts and acting as agents
for title insurers (T. 1:2-!-128). Hence, strictly speaking,
the Plaintiffs and Defendant are not engaged in competition. "\\1Iile this n1ay not be decisive, it is a factor. See
66 A.L.R. 934, 964, 967.
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(3) Words, "Security" and "Titl~" are Ge:neric and

in Common Use.
In addition the words, "security" and "title," are
both generic or descriptive words in common use (T. 18:2183). This again, while not a decisive factor, is a matter
to be considered for a greater similarity in names will
be tolerated when names are geographical or descriptive
than where the first corporation's name is fanciful and
arbitrary. See Federal Securities Co. v. Federal Securitie.s Corporation, Supra.
( 4) No Confusion inN early Two Y e,ars.

The most remarkable fact about the case at bar is
that in nearly two years of operation by the Defendant,
there has not been one instance of confusion. By the
time the three-day trial of the case had been concluded,
the Plaintiffs had failed to point to one single instance of
confusion that had arisen since the Defendant qualified
to do business in March of 1961.
The lack of confusion was even admitted by Mark
Eggertsen, who on cross-examination conceded that since
the Defendant had been doing business in this state,
there was no known instance of confusion between the
Defendant, the Plaintiff companies, and the Stanley
Title Company as the Defendant's agent. Mark Eggertsen's testimony was as follows:

"Q. Do you know of any instance where anyone has actually ordered a policy or abstract and
then because of your contact with them you have
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IParned that tlwy thought in the course of the
whole tran~adion they wPn' dealing with the Seeurity Title Insurance Company of California~
"A. No. Unless some of their own offices
who have referred business to us 1night have
thought so.
"Q. But you don't know of no individual
that - at least no information has come to your
attention that thought they were dealing with Seeurit~· rritle Insurance Company when they actually were dealing with your office~
.. A. Oh, I couldn't say. It is very possible
they could have.

"Q. I know. But you don't know of any
instance¥
''A.

No.

"Q. Do you know of anyone who has dealt
with your office and in the course of the transaction it became apparent to you that they thought
they were dealing with somebody connected with
~Ir. Stanley here in the City~ In other words,
that have thought that you were connected ·with
or associated in any way with the Stanley Title
Company?
''A. The only confusion we have had in that
respect to this point is that one or two of these
institutional offices have called and said that :ilfr.
Stanley had approached them in the solicitation
of business, and named the company, that is, the
defendant, as his underwriter, and was there any
relationship between them and us~

··Q. All right. Do you know of any of those
that· :have ever ordered a policy or have ever
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ordered an abstract and a policy has ultimately
been issued~ In other words a transaction completed in your office wherein it became apparent
to you by what was said or done that the person
with whom you were dealing thought he was dealing with Mr. Stanley~
"A. No-truthfully no. And I know what
you are heading to, but go ahead." (T. 214-215)

"Q. Do you know of anyone who has purchased any policy of title insurance, or arrranged
for any policy of title insurance, or abstract,
through the Stanley Title that you have later met
and discussed the matter with and from what was
said or done at least you concluded that the person was confused and had mistaken Mr. Stanley's
operation for yours~
"A.

No." (T. 216)

"Q. I take it that what you really have in
mind, Mr. Eggertsen, is that there has been to
date no basic confusion and what you really want
to avoid is a probability of confusion in the years
to come~
"A. Yes. I knew you were leading up to
that." (T. 218-219)
Nor has there been so much as one instance of confusion
in the office of Defendant's agent, the Stanley Title Company (T. 381, 382, 383,448,449,456,457, 458).
Not one of the Plaintiffs' witnesses had ever been
confused, nor did any of them know of any confusion that
had resulted from the Defendant doing business in the
state through Stanley· Title Company.
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F1) X(·ithcr Is Thl're Any Reasonable Probability

of Confllsion In The Future.
a. 1\?o Co-nfusion in Nearly Tzro Years.

The nearly two-year history of no confusion certainly Pvidences lack of any probable confusion in the future.
b. Analysis of 1Ya111es hl.voh·ed.

The Court's attention is again invited to the names
involved. The Plaintiffs' names are "Security Title COinpany" and "Security Title Guaranty Company," the latter
name being a recent change froin "Security Title Insurance Agency." The name, "Security Title Company,"
give8 no implication whatsoever that it is a title insurance company or that the company has anything to do
with insurance. The nrune, "Security Title Insurance
Agency,'' clearly evidences that that company is not a
title insurer, but that its activities are devoted solely to
those of an agency. Indeed, since both of the Plaintiff
companies are mere title insurance agencies, it would
be tmlawful for either company in any way to hold itself
out as a title insurer. Section 31-5-15, l-:-tah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
"31-5-15. Name in which business condtictedSubrogation - Limitations on assumption of
name. - (1) Each insurer shall conduct its business in its own legal name, except that in subrogation actions it may sue in the name of its assured.
(2) No insurer shall assume or use a name
deceptively similar to that of any other authorized
msurer.
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( 3) No person who is not an authorized insurer shall assume or use any name, which deceptively infers or suggests that it is an insurer."
(See also Section 31-Z7 -6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953.)
On the other hand the Defendant's name
edly shows that it is a title insurance company.

unmist~

(c) How Defendant lias Actually Used Its Name.

But that is not all. The Defendant has, in addition,
always used the further identifying words, " ... of Los
Angeles, California." There has been no attempt whatsoever to infringe on the business of the Plaintiff companies. The Defendant has engaged in no advertising
whatsoever calculated -to confuse its business with that
of the Plaintiffs. It has done business through its local
agent, Stanley Title Company, and it is the latter name
which has been prominently used. Reference is made to
Exhibit 23 which shows the business location of Stanley
Title Company and the use of that name, "Stanley Title
Company," in large letters as identifying the business
operated by George Stanley. The Defendant's name appeared only in small print in the lower right-hand corner
of the window and was used in connection with other
words clearly identifying its agency relationship to
Stanley Title Company and its location as being in Los
Angeles, California.
It must be re1nembered that it is the local title insurance agencies which procure business for the title
insurance carriers. The title insurance carriers them-
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~wlvrs

have little contaet with the general public, but
rather rely on local insuranee ageneit~s to procure business for them. By the time prelin1inary title reports are
ordered and issued, contacts with the title insurance
ageneiPs have been such that the chanees for confusion
resulting thereafter are nil.

rrhe Defendant has only permitted the use of its name
on title insurance binders, on policies of title insurance,
on letterheads of Stanley Title Company, and on the
window of Stanley Title Company. In each instance its
:-\tatus as an insurance company as such and its agency
relationship to the Stanley Title Company has been
apparent.
The Court's attention is again invited to the cases
where the use of silnilar names was permitted so long
as the companies added or continued to add the location
identification such as: "of Canada" (Saunders v. Sun L.
Assur. Co. (189-1) 1 Ch. (Eng.) 537, noted in 66 A.L.R.
!l-l~. !lS3); "of K.ansas" (International Trust Co. v. International Loan & T. Co. (1891) 153 ~\lass. 271, 10 L.R.A.
15S, 26 ::\!".E. 693); and "of Illinois" (Federal Securities
Co. r. Federal Securities Corp., 276 P. 1100, 66 A.L.R.
934).
(d) Pert:inent Testimony of Each Witness Reviewed.

As already pointed out, not one of the witnesses had
ever been confused, and not one of them testified that he
knew of any confusion that had resulted from the Defendant's doing business through the Stanley Title Com-
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pany. "\Yhen asked to give their opinions, all of the witnesses, with one exception, testified that based on their
experience, there would be no confusion among those who
generally deal with title insurance companies. The JWrtinent testimony of each witness who testified on the
question of confusion and the probability of confusion
in the future is as follows:
M.ark Eggertsen:

Mark Eggertsen was responsible for and is the
president of both of Plaintiff companies (T. 121, 122,
128, Exhibits 20, 21). He knew of no confusion up to
the time of the trial (T. 215, 218). His position was that
he just wanted to avoid the probability of confusion
in the future ( T. 219).
Don H. Henager:

Don H. Henager 1s the secretary-treasurer of the
Plaintiff, Security Title Company (T. 243). He testified
that there had been some confusion in his mind resulting
from the doing business in this state of the Defendant,
Security Title Insurance Company, by reason of mail
addressed to "Security Title Insurance Company" at the
Plaintiffs' address (T. :2-15). He stated, however, that he
always opened such mail (T. 262) and that in not one
instance had he found any mail that was actually intended for the Defendant (T. 262). Nor did he know of
any instance where any mail had been sent to the Defendant which was intended for either of the Plaintiffs (T.
263).
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L~tcille

R. lJ'right:

Lueillt- R. \Vright is the vice president of Security
'l'itle Guaranty Company and senior vice president of
~P<'urity Title Co. (T. 269). She testified that she had
been requesh•d by .Mr. Allen l-1. Tibbals to take samples
ot' mail addressed to the office of the Plaintiffs in the
name of ··8ecurity Title Insurance Oompany" (T. 276).
Exhibit No. 32 contained four of such samples (T. 276).
On cross-examination she admitted, however, that none
of the envelopes caused any confusion (T. 276-279). She
further testified that the persons who route the title
insurance are generally familiar with the title insurance
agencies ( T. 282).

Pat rick J. Sullivan:
Patrick J. Sullivan is the vice president of the McGhie Abstract & Title Company of Salt Lake City ( T.
283). He was asked if having two companies using the
words, "Security Title" created confusion. The Defendant's objection to the question was overruled and Mr.
Sullivan stated: "I would think so." (T. 285-286). He
stated that mail addressed in the name of "Security
T.itle Insurance Company" without any address or any
identification would, after the Defendant's having commenced doing business, be confusing to him ( T. 287). He
was asked whether the industry would find it confusing to
have two companies utilizing the words "Security Title"
in business (T. 288). Objection was again made on the
ground that the question called for a conclusion and on
the further grounds that there was no characterization
as to how the words might be used. He answered that he
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thought it would be confusing (T. 288). Yet he testified that he was well aware of the fact that the Plaintiffs
were not insurance cmnpanies (T. 290). He was aware
of the fact that to address either of the Plaintiff corporations as "Security Title Insurance Company" would be
totally in error (T. 290). Exhibit No. 32 was not confusing
to him (T. 290). Then :Mr. Sullivan admitted that as to
whether or not there would be any confusion in the use
of the words, "Security Title" would perhaps depend on
how the words were used ( T. 290). If other words were
used with "Security Title" for identification, it might
be such as to cause no confusion ( T. 291). He confirmed
the fact that the bulk of title insurance is ordered by
people in banks, lending institutions, insurance companies, real estate agencies, lawyers, etc. (T. 292). His attention was then directed to Exhibit No. 23 (T. 291), and
over objection of Plaintiffs' counsel he finally admitted
that he wouldn't think such a use would confuse the people who usually order title insurance (T. 292). Then
he took an apparently inconsistent position and testified that the same words as are on the window of Stanley
Title Company would to a lot of people be confusing on
preliminary title reports and policies; that is, the words,
"Security Title," make it confusing, and such identification wouldn't make it completely clear because there
were a lot of people in Salt Lake City "that thinks the
name of Security Title Company of Salt Lake City is Salt
Lake City Title Insurance Company, since they ordered
policies from them. I would think the whole thing is
rather confusing to the general public." (T. 293). However, if by a "lot of people" :Mr. Sullivan meant people
other than the professional clientele we have referred
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to, then his testimony may not be inconsistent. On erossPxamination he adn1itted, however, that he had never been
eonfuHPd ( T. 295).

ln evaluating iltr. ~ullivan's testimony it is apparent
that he had never been confused, nor had he heard of
anyone who had ever been confused. In what context
the words "Security Title" were used would be significant. He was certainly inconsistent when he stated that
the words on the window would not be confusing, but
~tated that the same words on the preliminary title reports and title insurance policies would be confusing to a
ulot of people," unless he meant people other than the
professional clientele. The fact that the Plaintiffs received 1nail addressed in the name of "Security Title
Insurance Company" cannot be of any help to the Plaintiffs in this case, as such name is not the corporate name
of either of the Plaintiffs and simply evidences an ignorance in the minds of the senders of such 1nail as to the
nature of the business and the correct names of the
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs must stand or fall on their own
corporate name (Central Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Central
.1/ut. Ins. Co., Supra). As already pointed out, the statutes of this state prohibit a person or company not an
insurance company from using any name that infers that
it is such (Sec. 31-5-15 and Sec. 31-27-6, U.C.A., 1953).
Since it would thus be illegal for the Plaintiffs to use
the name "Security Title I nsur,ance Company," the Plaintiffs cannot claim the benefit of such name when they
are so referred to by some uninformed member of the
public.
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As a further aid to evaluating Thlr. Sullivan's te:-~ti
mony, the trial court should have and this court ought to
take into consideration that he was a client of counsel
for the Plaintiffs (T. 298).

Glen M. Acomb :
Mr. Acomb is a member of the bar of this state and
Chief Deputy Salt Lake County Recorder (T. 299). 1\lr.
Acomb was asked if another company were to utilize in
the land title field or title insurance field the words "Security Title," whether this would, in his opinion, create
any confusion in the office of the County Recorder. (T.
300).
The Defendant's objection to the question was overruled and Mr. Acomb replied that he thought it would;
that in the processing of documents and the return of
documents, just the name of Security Title is shown
and that would be confusing if there were two companies
of the same nan1e. ( T. 300).
He testified further that docrnnents bearing the
words "Security Title Insurance Company," "Security
Title Guaranty Company," and "Security Title Agency"
would be sent to the Plaintiffs (T. 300). However, on
cross-examination, he testified that the identification
of the Defendant on the window of Stanley Title Company would not be confusing to the public who generally
deal with title insurance matters (T. 302). Neither
was Exhibit No. 15, one of Stanley Title Company's preliminary report forms, considered by him to be confusing
(T. 303). Incidentally, the Preliminary Report Form,
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~xhibit

No. 15, has been superseded by a newer form
Pven further retnoved fr01n the possibility of confusion
rr. 388, 396, 397). The words "Security Title" used as
they were on the window and title insurance policies,
with other words identifying and distinguishing the Defendant company, would not be confusing (T. 303). The
cn1x of the whole question was summed up in his observation on cross-examination to the effect that whether
or not there would be confusion would depend on how
the words were used ( T. 303, 304).

JVcston Garrett:
:\lr. Garrett is the manager of Security Title and
Company in Provo, Utah (T. 305). He testified that he knew of no instances of confusion in the
Provo area between the Plaintiff and Defendant companies (T. 308). In his opinion the words "Security Title"
identified his company in that area; that is, the Se·curity
Title and Abstract Company.
Ab~tract

:Jir. Garrett's testimony could be of little help to the
Plaintiffs for not only did he know of no confusion, but
there was nothing to show from his testimony that there
would be any probability of confusion by the Defendant
in using its corporate name with the further identifying
and distinguishing words that have already been referred to.

Gordon Gurr:
:Jir. Gurr resides in Kaysville, Utah, and now maintains an office in Farmington, Utah, where he operates the intermountain division of the Plaintiff Security
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Title Company ( T. 310). He was asked on direct examination if the Defendant corporation were to be permitted the unlimited use of its corporate name, "Security Title Insurance Company," whether, in the best of his
judgment and experience as an abstracter and title man,
this would cause any confusion with respect to the
Plaintiff companies. (T. 312-313). Over objection, he
testified that his company had used the words "Security
Title" by themselves for so long that if someone else
used these names this would be confusing ( T. 313).
Such testimony can be of little help to the Plaintiffs
for the Defendant has never undertaken "the unlimited
use" of its corporate name. Neither has it ever used the
words "Security Title" by themselves. The Defendant
has always been careful in the use of its name, has always
used further identifying and distinguishing words in connection with its corporate name, and has never used the
words "Security Title" by themselves.

Raymond G. Willie :
l\Ir. Willie is a Vice President of the First Security
Bank of Utah in the Mortgage Division (T. 355). He
stated that the bank had ordered and requested title insurance from the Plaintiff, which company he referred to
as "Security Title Insurance Qompany" (T. 356). He
stated that he refers to l\Ir. Eggertsen's company as
"Security Title Insurance Company" (T. 356). He states
that Mr. Eggertsen's company is commonly referred to
in the bank as ''Security Title Insurance Company" (T.
356). l-Ie stated that he had never actually inquired as
to whether or not "Security Title Insurance Company"
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was the correct name of the Plaintiffs' company (T. 356).
That he had never particularly cared (T. 356). He stated
that Mr. Stanley had solicited the bank's business, but
he had no recollection of Mr. Stanley having solicited
through the name of the Defendant company. He was
then asked on direct examination :
". . . do you find that the possibility of two
companies doing business under the name of 'Security Title' in the State of Utah would be productive of confusion¥" (T. 358)
Over objection he was allowed to answer the question
and stated:
•·wen, that is a very difficult question to
answer, Mr. Tibbals. I am sufficiently familiar
with title insurance that it doesn't confuse me.
Yet, on the other hand, I can readily see where
someone that wasn't, didn't order as many title
policies as First Security might well be confused,
yes." (T. 358-359)
He was then shown Exhibit No. 32 and asked whether
he would •• be able to tell from the name of the insurance
company whether that is the company represented by 1\ir.
Stanley or the one that is represented by Mr. Eggertsen."
.. Xo, you couldn't," he replied, "the nan1es are identical
except for the addresses." (T. 359).
On cross-examination he admitted that he !knew of
no confusion between the business conducted under the
name of Stanley Title Company which had designated on
its window "State Agent for Security Title Insurance
Company," and the operation of Mr. Eggertsen at 45
East Fourth South Street (T. 361). His attention was
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directed to Exhibit No. 32 and reference was made to all
of the identification on the envelopes and indicated that
no confusion would be caused (T. 361). On cross-examination he was asked :
"Now I was interested in your statement that
you refer to the plaintiff company, Security Title
Company, as Security Title Insurance Company,
is that the way you refer to that company consistently~" (T. 361)
He replied:
"That is right. They issue title insurance and
that is what we order. Consequently we think of
it in terms of Security Title Insurance Company."
(T. 361)
In summary Mr. Willie pointed to no confusion that
has existed and confirmed the fact that First Security
Bank had never been confused; and that Exhibit No. 32,
considered as a whole, was not confusing. .Any confusion
that did exist, as far as he was concerned, seems to stem
from the fact that the Plaintiffs have permitted themselves to be erroneously identified in the public mind as
an insurance company. .Again we emphasize that the
Plaintiffs must stand on their own corporate names and
cannot have the benefit of the Defendant's name or the
benefit of other words suggesting that the Plaintiffs
are insurance companies, whether such words are used
intentionally by the Plaintiffs or carelessly by some uninformed member of the public (Sec. 31-5-15, r.C.A.,
1953).
On the same question of confusion or the probability
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of eonfusion the Defendant's witnesses testified as follows:
Ocorge B. Stanley:

George B. Stanley is the President of Stanley Title
Company, which company is the Defendant's agent in the
~tatu of Utah (T. 363, 371). lie testified that the prot'Pssional clientele is well acquainted with the title in:-;urance agencies (T. 376). He stated that 40 per cent
of his title insurance business has been referred to rum
up here in Salt Lake City by the Defendant company,
and that he wants to identify his company as being the
statl' agent for Security Title Insurance Company of Los
Angeles (T. 377). He wanted it explicitly understood that
he was but an agent of the California company (T. 378).
He has never observed in handling the mail and telephone
t'alls any confusion (T. 382).
There simply has been no confusion ('T. 383). The
use of tl1e name, "Security Title Insurance Company,"
as associated with other words of identification as presently used on the window, title insurance policies and
preliminary title reports would not be likely to cause
confusion (T. 384).
Pa.ul JI endenhall:
Paul :Mendenhall is engaged in the real estate business and has been since 1954 ( T. 400). His business is
Yery substantial (T. ±01). His attention was then directed
to Exhibit :X o. 23 portraying the window of the Stanley
Title Company (T. 404), and to the designation of the
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Defendant in the corner of the window, and he was asked
whether that was intended to cause any confusion in his
mind; that is, the Security Title Insurance Company
doing business through Stanley Title Company as compared with Mr. Eggertsen's companies. His reply was
"No" (T. 404). He was asked whether in his real estate
transactions involving title insurance he had ever known
of any case of confusion. Again his reply was ''No'' ( T.
404-405). We then sought to elicit from Mr. Mendenhall
the type of testimony that Mr. Tibbals had elicited from
witnesses for the Plaintiffs by asking Mr. Mendenhall:
"In your opinion would people who act in
your capacity in this area; that is, the real estate
people and among the circles in which you travel,
in which you move, in your opinion and judging
from your experience, would they be inclined to
be deceived by the designation or identification
of the title insurer on the window of Stanley Title
Company~" (T. 405)
:1\fr. Tibbals' objection to the question was sustained.
He then testified that if similar words of identification as appeared on the window of Stanley Title Company appear on title insurance policies or preliminary
title reports, that such, as far as he was concerned, would
cause no confusion. (T. 405).

George W. Brown:
:Mr. Brown is presently the manager of the Federal
Land Bank Association of Provo, Utah (T. 407). The
Federal Land Bank is involved in making real estate
loans to farmers and ranchers, etc. ( T. 408). He testi-
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fied of the care and attention given by the Federal Land
Bank to determining the qualifications of a title insuranee company (T. 409-410). He is familiar with a number
of titlP insurance agencies and familiar with the parties
in this action. He has had good business experience with
both the Stanley Title Company and the Security Title
& Abstract Company of Provo, which latter oompany is
affiliated with the Plaintiffs (T. 410). He was well acquainted with the Defendant company for whom the
Stanley Title acts as an agent (T. 411). He has never
been confused in his dealings with Stanley Title Company (T. -111). There has been no confusion in the way
the Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, i~
identified with the Stanley Title Company operation (T.
412). He has never heard anything that would indicate
that there has ever been any confusion in the dealings of
the Federal Land Bank. Such confusion would normally
be brought to the attention of the company ( T. 412-413).
He testified that the words "Security Title" alone used by
another company improperly could cause confusion ( T.
413-414), but whether or not such confusion would exist
would depend on how the words were actually used ( T.
414).
John W. Horsley:
~Ir. Horsley is a local attorney who has practiced in
this area for eleven years ( T. 418). He has handled a
lot of real estate transactions and is well acquainted
with the attorneys in this area (T. 418). Real estate
transactions with which he has been connected have frequently involved title insurance (T. 419). He testified
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that title insurance companies were well known among
attorneys here in the city (T. 420). When his client does
not have a preference of a title insurance company, he
frequently suggests one (T. 419). He was shown Exhibit No. 23-the picture of the front window of the
Stanley Title Company - and he testified that there
would be no confusion caused by the Defendant being
identified as the insurance company for whom Stanley
Title Company acted as agent (T. 420, 421). He stated
that there would be no confusion arise in his mind by
the use of the words, "Security Title Insurance Company
of Los Angeles, a California corporation," if those words
appeared on a policy of title insurance issued through
the Stanley Title Company or on a preliminary title report as opposed to a title insurance policy issped through
:Mr. Eggertsen's office (T. 421). He was asked whether,
in his general experience in the profession among attorneys, as to whether there would he any deception
caused thereby. He replied:
"Well, I should think most lawyers would
know the difference between an insurer and an
agent." (T. 421)
The difference between Mr. Stanley's title company and
Mr. Eggertsen's, with the identification of the Defendant as shown on the window of Stanley Title Company,
would cause no confusion (T. 421).

A. Melvin McDonald:
Mr. McDonald has been affiliated with the Walker
Bank and Trust Company since 1939, and is now a vice
president of the bank in charge of real estate loans and
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all of the branches of t11e bank ( T 0 424) 0 He supervises
the real estatP loan division of the bank and approves real
estate loans and the disbursing of funds in connection
with real estate loans ( T 0 425). The real estate operation of the bank is of considerable magnitude (To 425)0
He frequently finds himself dealing with title insurance
ero -!~<i)o The bank always requests financial statements
giving the financial status of title insurers (To 426)0 He
was acquainted with the Plaintiffs, the Stanley Title
Company, and was familiar with the fact that the Def£•rHlant was the insurer represented by the Stanley
Title Company (To 427-428)0 His attention was directed
to the photograph of the Stanley Title Company, Exhibit
~ o. :2:~, and he stated that the same would cause no
deception in his mind because he was perfectly familiar
with the operation of both offices (T. 428)o He further
h·~tified that judging from his experience and ba~
ground in the mortgage loan business, that other men
likewise engaged in such a capacity in institutions of
the eity would likewise be familiar with both operations
and not confused ( T. 428). He further testified that the
identification of the Defendant as "Security Title Insurance Company of Los Angeles, California," if it appears
on a title report or title policy would not cause any confusion to him or others similarly engaged (T. 428). He
was not at all confused by Exhibi·t No. 32 ( T. 431).
Jesse J/. Ellertson:
~Ir. Ellertson is connected with the title insurance
business and abstracting business and operates a company known as Title Insurance Agency of Utah, which
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company has an underwriting agreement with the Kansas
City Title Insurance Company. lie has been in the
business for twenty years at the same address on Main
Street in Salt Lake City (T. 434). His company is one
of the well-established and older companies engaged in
the business in this area (T. 434). He was acquainted
with the parties in this case (T. 435). He pointed out that
the clientele of his company generally comes from what
he referred to as institutional business; that is, mortgage lending institutions, small loan institutions, the legal
profession and real estate firms (T. 435). He is well
acquainted with the title insurance agencies in this area
(T. 436). His clientele is typical of the title insurance
business (T. 436). Ninety-five per cent of his business
comes from these institutional clients (T. 436). The
institutional or professional clientele is very interested
in the actual company that underwrites or issues the
title insurance policies. He emphasized how important
his affiliation with Kansas City Title was in selling his
business ( T. 437). The ti tie insurance business is a
service type of business ( T. 437), as opposed to buying a
piece of merchandise wholesale and selling it retail (T.
438). Title insurance businesses are not in the business
of dealing with a commodity (T. 438). His attention was
directed to Exhibit No. 23, the photograph of the front
window of the Stanley Title Company, and particularly
to the identification of the Defendant on the window.
When asked whether such identification would cause
deception among the clientele dealing with title insurance
companies, he stated :
"Oh, I wouldn't think so. There are occasions
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but I don't think this would confuse anyone, the
use of it that way."
(\pitlwr would such words of identification on policies of
title insurance cause any confusion ( T. 439). His attention was then directed to Exhibit No. 35, a preliminary
title report, and his attention was directed to the words,
"Stanley Title Company," and other words identifying
the Defendant, "State Agent for Security Title Insurance Company of Los Angeles, California." He stated
that among the clientele and personnel with whom he
dealt and title insurance companies deal generally, such
identification of the insurer would not cause deception
or confusion. (T. 440).
Paul B. Stanley:

Paul Stanley is Vice President of Stanley Title Company, the agent for the Defendant company (T. 446).
He comes in contact with customers or clientele served
by the company ( T. +! 7). He processses the mail ( T.
448), and frequently handles the telephone (T. 448).
rrhere has never been any circumstance or observation
that has led him to believe that there has been any confusion (T. 4±8). There has never been any mail sent to
the office of Stanley Title Company, the contents of
which were obviously intended for the Plaintiffs (T.
449). He has never seen as much as one piece of mail
misdirected. He had never observed anything in any
transaction that evidenced to him any confusion ( T. 449).
Defendant's identification on the window of Stanley
Title Company was, in his opinion, not calculated to
cause any confusion among the people with whom they
deal (T. +!9-450).

57

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Azel T. Sorensen:
Mr. Sorensen is engaged in the real estate business
( T. 451). He has occasion to handle or be involved in
placing orders concerning titles to property (T. -1-51).
He stated that realtors generally place the title insurance when the need for such arises in their transactions
(T. 451-452). He and most real estate men are acquainted with the title insurance agencies ( T. 452). His attention was directed to Exhibit 23 and the words thereon
identifying the Defendant. He stated that such never
confused him ( T. 453) and neither would such words on
preliminary title reports or title policies. He had known
the Defendant company in Los Angeles, California (T.
453).

Burton M. Stanley:
Burton M. Stanley is the Secretary-Treasurer and
Title Officer of Stanley Title Company. He has considerable contact with clientele of the Stanley Title Company
and accepts title insurance orders (T. 456). He does considerable work over the telephone and likewise handles
the mail. I-Iis desk is the first one to receive the mail (T.
456). Since the operation of Stanley Title Company as
the agent for Defendant, he has never seen anything or
had anything brought to his attention by any person
which would indicate that there was any confusion (T.
456-457). There has never been any mail misdirected
(T. 457). There has never been anyone with whom he has
dealt or with wh01n he has completed a transaction who
has indicated that he was confused as to with whom he
was dealing (T. 457).
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T.ynn .11. 8tanley; Frances 1/arriL..,·on; George B. Stanley:

Lynn ~1. Stanley of the Stanley Title Company was
thPn called as a witness, whereupon Mr. Tibbals, counsel
for the Plaintiffs, entered into a stipulation that Lynn
M. Stanley would state that he had never been confused
or heard of any party that had been confused, never
h('ard of any confusion, and that there is nothing that
i~ being confused (T. 458). The same stipulation was
made applicable to Frances Harrison (T. 458), another
employee of Stanley Title Company.

It was then stipulated that if George B. Stanley were
recalled to the stand, that he would state that this was
all of his personnel in the organization that handles the
mail, tPlephone, or clientele of the company (T. 459).

By way of summary of all of the foregoing testimony,
it is apparent that there has never been any confusion.

Xeither have the Plaintiffs' witnesses carried the burden
of ~howing that there is a probability of confusion arising
out of the way the Defendant company has carried on
it8 business thus far in the State of Utah. There is
evidence that the use of the words "Security Title" alone
might cause some confusion. There is testimony that the
Plaintiffs have sometimes been referred to as "Security
Title Insurance Company." Suffice it to say that the
Defendant has never used the words, "Security Title"
alone, but has always used its full corporate name and
in addition other words of identification. Furthermore,
it is again pointed out that the Plaintiffs have no right
whatsoever to claim any benefit of the name "Security
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Title Insurance Con1pany." If any of the public has been
confused as to the status of the Plaintiffs and referred
to the Plaintiffs or either of them as insurance companies, then it can only be said that such misapprehension is the very thing that our statutes have been designed to guard against. The Plaintiffs are not entitled
to hold themselves out as insurance carriers (Section
31-5-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). The Plaintiffs
cannot identify themselves as "Security Title Insurance
Company" for such is not the name of either company
and to do so would be in direct violation of the statutes
of this state. If the Plaintiffs cannot so identify themselves, certainly no benefit can flow to them by being
so referred to by the careless and uninformed.
(e) The Plaintiffs Must Stand Or Fall on Their
Own Corporate N arnes.

At the trial of the case the Plaintiffs introduced in
evidence four envelopes (Exhibit No. 32) which had been
received by the Plaintiffs. A. point was made of the fact
that in three of the four instances the envelopes were
addressed to "Security Title Insurance Company" at the
Plaintiffs' address at 45 East 4th South Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah. Counsel for the Plaintiffs argued that
the Plaintiff companies, having been thus identified in
the minds of the senders of the envelopes, which persons
represent a portion of the public, nothing but confusion
would result from the Defendant pursuing its business
in the State of Utah under its corporate name.
The Plaintiffs, however, cannot claim the benefit
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of any name other than their own corporate name. See
Central J.llut. Au.to 1 ns. Co. v. Central Mu.t. Ins. Co.,
Supra, where the plaintiff claimed that notwithstanding
its corporate name, it had become known by the name
"Central :Mutual Insurance Company," and as "Central
~lntual," and its insurance policies as "Central" policies.
Said the court :
HPlaintiff claims that notwithstanding its corporate name, it has become known by the name
'Central Mutual Insurance Company' and as
'Central Mutual,' and its insurance policies as
'Central' policies. This is immaterial. The plaintiff must stand or fall on its corporate name. The
statutes above quoted recognize the corporate
name only. Detroit Savings Bank v. Highland
Park State Bank of Detroit, 201 Mich. 601, 167
N.W. 895."
The Court's attention is further invited to S€ctions
31-5-15 and 31-27-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
provide that no person who is not an authorized insurer
shall assume or use any name which deceptively infers
or suggests that it is an insurer. Certainly the Plaintiffs
cannot claim the benefit of the Defendant's own name by
reason of any carelessness on the part of particular individuals. The Defendant is not an insurer against such
ignorance or carelessness. The observation of the annotator in 115 A.L.R. 1241, 1247, is in point:
"And as supporting the further statement
made in the original annotation that the test has
frequently been said to be whether the similarity
is such as to mislead a person using ordinary care
and discrimination, attention is called to the
following language in Central Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
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v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. (1936) 275 :Mich. 554,
267 N.W. 733: 'There may be some confusion resulting from the similarity of the names of plaintiff and defendant, but the confusion of which the
court takes cognizance must be something more
than that resulting from carelessness or ignorance on the part of the lminformed.... Defendant is not an insurer against the ignorance or
carelessness of particular individuals, and may be
enjoined from the use of its corporate name after
admission to do business in the state by the
commissioner of insurance by that name, only
upon a showing the similarity of its name to that
of plaintiff will mislead, or probably mislead, the
public to the detriment or injury of plaintiff.' See
also United States Plywood Co. v. United Plywood Corp. (1932) 19 Del. Ch. 27, 161 A. 913,
where it was said: 'The name "United Plywood
Corporation"ought not to be confused by any
reasonably intelligent or ordinarily observant
person with "United States Plywood Co."'"
(6) The Case of B'/l)dget System, Inc. v. Budget

Loan and Finance Plan, Infr,a, is Distinguishable.
In reaching its decision the trial court relied on
the case of Budget System, Inc. v. Budget Lo.an and Finance Plan, 12 U. 2d 18, 361 P.2d 512 (1961) (T. 461).
In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant
loan company frmn using the word "budget" in its name.
Since 1945 the plaintiff, Budget System, Inc., had operated a small loan business at 854 South State Street in
Salt Lake City. Previously for about five years it had
done business at 763 South State Street. The defendant
corporation, Budget Loan and Finance Plan, continued
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it~ ~mull

loan business at 80~ South State ~treet, cmnmencing in ~ ovember, 1958. The trial court found that
the word Bbudget" in defendant's name since 1955 had
caused and would t'ontinue to cause confusion and de('t>ption to the public in the Salt Lake City area among
prP~t>nt and potential custmners; that the similarity of
tlw name was a deceptive use by the defendant, an unfair
trade practice and would result in probable damage to
plaintiff's business. The trial court rendered judgment
in l'avor of the plaintiff and the decree was affirmed on
appeal. rrhe case, however, is clearly distinguishable
from the instant case in at least the following particulars:
(a) The en1ployees of the parties themselves, as
well as patrons of each, had suffered actual confusion
in tl1e separate offices.
(b) The defendant emphasized the word "budget"
in letterheads and outdoor electrical signs.
(c) The appeal of both plaintiff and defendant businesses as small loan operations was to an undiscerning
segment of the general public.
(d) The plaintiff and defendant companies were in
actual competition with each other.
In ~hort, the businesses conducted by the parties in
tJ1e Budget case were quite unlike the businesses involved
in the instant case, which appeal to a skilled, professional
clientele. In the Budget case there had been actual confusion. In the instant case there has been no confusion.
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In the Budget case the defendant had actually emphasized by the use of neon lights the name "Budget" which
was the word in controversy. In the instant case the Defendant has clearly identified and distinguished itg business from that of the Plaintiffs. In the Budget case
there was an apparent intent to deceive the public. In
the instant case there has been no such intent. In the
Budget case the parties were direct competitors appealing
to an undiscerning segment of the public. In the instant
case the parties are not competitors and deal with a
most informed part of the public.
(7) Att,itude of the Defendant.

The Defendant is a well-established title insurance
company (T. 315). It has enjoyed a substantial growth
('T. 315) and for meritorious reasons has qualified to
do business in this state (T. 319). Expansion and diversification are important to the welfare of the company
( T. 319). The company has thought that confusion between its operation and the Plaintiff companies was
quite unlikely ('T. 324). The absence of confusion since
the Defendant has qualified in the state justifies the
thinking of those responsible for the management of the
Defendant. The management of the Defendant is very
much interested in there being no confusion (T. 324).
The Defendant, Security Title Insurance Company, is
well known as a title insurer, enjoying an excellent public image and reputation (T. 324-325). It is the fourth
largest title insurance company in the United States,
having a substantial financial position (T. 325). The
Defendant does not wish to he confused with anyone,
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partieularly when there cannot be any control over that
person or company with whom confusion exists (T. 325).
The Defendant has always used its full corporate
name and in addition thereto appended additional words
of identification and distinction. The testimony of Bruce
JonP~, the Secretary and a Director of the Defendant,
clearly sets forth the attitude of the company:

"'Ne wish to be known solely by what we do
and what we are, and not by what anybody else
does. And if we thought there was any chance of
confusion we would take whatever steps we
thought were necessary to eliminate it." (T. 325)
The following testimony was then elicited from
Bruce Jones.

"Q. Now are you willing to take such steps
then as you would consider reasonable to avoid
any confusion between your company, the defendant, and the plaintiff companies¥
"A. Anything that was reasonable and to
the extent we felt at all necessary - yes, we
would." ( T. 325)

* * *
"Q. I believe then your attitude is simply
to identify yourself, is that correct¥
"A.

That is correct." (T. 326)

In other words, the Defendant having qualified with
the Insurance Commissioner in this state simply desires
to remain here and legitimately pursue its business, and
is willing to take whatever steps necessary to identify
and distinguish its operation from that of the Plaintiffs'.
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POINT NO. II.
THE FINDINGS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT, EVEN
IF PROPER, DO NOT SUPPORT THE BROAD INJUNCTION
IMPOSED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.

Even if the Findings as entered are proper, they do
not support such a broad injunction against the Defendant as was entered by the trial court.
The Defendant has been restrained from "doing business in the State of Utah under the name, 'Security Title
Insurance Con1pany,' or under any name employing the
words, 'Security Title' in any combination therein, or
from using said name or words in the solicitation, conduct
or carrying on of the business of abstracting, land title
examination, title insurance or any related activity."
It must be remembered that the Defendant has been
authorized by the Insurance Commissioner of the State
of Utah to do business in this state. The court in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. All St,ate's Life Insurance Co., 246 F.2d
161, 170, stated:
"That a determination by such an administrative tribunal is of great relevance and should be
given great weight in a regulated industry."
See also Central Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Central Mutual
Insurance Co., 275 Mich. 554, 267 N.W. 733.
As already pointed out in this brief, the Defendant
should not be restrained from exercising this grant of
authority unless in identifying itself in carrying on its
business it has caused or will ljkely cause confusion.
Assuming that the Findings as made were appropriate,
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then the door should be left open for the Defendant to
endeavor to further identify itself. See International
Trust Co. v. lntern.ation.al Loan & Trust Co., 26 N.E. 693
( ~Ia~~., 1891); Fa nncrs Lua n & T. Co. v. Far-mers Loan
& 1'. Co., (1SS8) 21 Abb. ~\.C. 104, 1 N.Y. Supp. 44;
8allndfrs v. 81111 L. As.-,ur. Co. (1894) 1 Ch. (Eng.) 537.
The l)pfendant's corporate nmne is "Security Title
lnsltrancf Company.'' This is the name by which it has
qualified with the Insurance Cornmissioner to do busim·~~ in the State of l Ttah. However, it has always further
identified itself with such words as "of Los Angeles" or
"a California corporation." If such words are inadequate to identify the Defendant, then the Defendant
~hould be given an opportunity to clothe its name with
additional identifying and distinguishing words to entirely remove the possibility of confusion between the
Defendant and either of the Plaintiff corporations.
The Plaintiffs would like to have a n1onopoly on
the words "Security Title" irrespective of the context in
which used. This, of course, is wholly improper. All the
Plaintiffs have a right to expect is freedom from actual
or probable confusion. See Herring·-H.all-Marvin Safe
Co. c. Hall's Safe Co., 208 U.S. 55±, 52 L.Ed. 616, 28 Sup.
Ct. Hep. 350, 66 A.L.R 93-1, 942; L. E. TV·aterman Co. v.
Jiodern Pen Co., :235 U.S. 88, 59 L. Ed. 1-1:2, 35 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 91, 66 ..:-\.L.R. 934, 943.
"The right of a corporation to protection
against the use of the same or a similar name by
another corporation is intunately connected with
the right to protection for a trademark or a
tradenan1e, and the right to protection against unfair competition. Indeed, in a great many in67
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stances, as will be hereafter noted, the prmciples to be applied in the two classes of cases are
practically identical." 66 A.L.R. 948, 950.
If Finding No. 12 means that the use of the words
"Security Title" alone are confusing, then the court is
reminded that the Defendant has never so used the words.
The Defendant has always used its full corporate name
and then added further words of identification.
If Finding No. 12 means that the words "Security
Title'' in any conceivable context would be confusing, then
such a finding is totally unsupported by the evidence,
for the words at the trial were only considered in the
context theretofore actually used by the Plaintiffs and
the Defendant. Even if such testimony were in the
record, such would be completely speculative. What witness could even state that the words "Security Title"
would be confusing in any context~ And if such testimony had been given, and it was not, the same would
be rank speculation. To cite possible examples of the
use of the words "Security Title" in a name used in a
context that would clearly distinguish the name from the
plaintiffs is simply to illustrate the obvious.
The only use Finding No. 12 could refer to is the use
of the corporate name alone or with the further identifying words as actually employed by the Defendant, towit, " ... of Los Angeles, California" or" ... a California
corporation." As already pointed out and for the reasons
noted, the Defendant contends that such use and identification is sufficient.
Finding No. 14 is patently valueless. What the Defendant "could" do or might possibly do is not sufficient
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to Hustain the injunctive relief granted the Plaintiffs.
( 'onfusion or probable confusion is the test. The distinction between "could" and "probable" from an evidentiary standpoint is so well known to the law, and the
insuffi<'iency of the former as a basis for a judgment so
beyond dispute as to require no further comment.
POINT NO. III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDING
NO. 13 THAT "NO SUBSTANTIAL LOSS TO THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION WOULD RESULT FROM DENIAL OF
THE RIGHT TO THE USE OF THE NAME 'SECURITY
TITLE' IN THE STATE OF UTAH."

Finding No. 13 in its entirety is as follows :
"13. Defendant corporation has to date
written something less than 70 title insurance
policies in the State of Utah calling for a premium income of less than $10,000.00. No substantial loss to defendant corporation would result
from denial of the right to it of use of the name
'Security Title' in the State of Utah."
Nothing in the record justifies the last sentence of
the finding.
The right of the Defendant to do business in the
State of Utah now and in the years to come certainly
cannot be measured by the policies issued or the premium
income to date. Bruce Jones, the Secretary and a Director
of Security Title Insurance Company, testified of the importance to the company of its continuing to do business in the State of Utah (T. 319). His testimony was unrefuted. The company to date has gone to considerable
expense and much difficulty in qualifying in Utah. Obvi-
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ously, as the economy of this state continues to increase
so, likewise, will the value of the Defendant's right to do
business in the state increase.
SUMMARY
In summary, the Defendant, Securit~· Title Insurance Company, contends that the trial court committed
error in 1naking Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 14-, in
m~king Conclusions Nos. 2 and 3, and in restraining the
Defendant as was done. The Defendant has endeavored
to use only its full corporate name and has always used
additional words of identification. The nature of the
Defendant's business in the manner in which it has engaged in such has resulted in no confusion in nearly two
:\'·ears. There is no reasonable probability of such in the
future. Even if the Findings complained of were proper,
the broad injunction imposed against the Defendant was
not justified. The Judgment and Decree of the trial
court in restraining the Defendant should be reversed
and the Defendant should be permitted to continue its
business in this state.
Respectfull~r

submitted,

:Mci{AY AND BURTON

~;d_t/4f1~}/ft~fA!~ ,'- Macoy A. McMurray
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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